Declarative Specification and Alignment Verification of Services in ITIL by Rychkova, Irina et al.
 1 
 
Declarative Specification and Alignment Verification of Services in ITIL  
 
 
Irina Rychkova1, Gil Regev2, Alain Wegmann3 
Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne (EPFL), School of Communication and 
Computer Science, CH-1015 Lausanne, Switzerland 
{1irina.rychkova@epfl.ch, 2gil.regev@epfl.ch, 3alain.wegmann@epfl.ch} 
Abstract 
 
IT organizations that wish to implement the best 
practices recommended by the IT Infrastructure 
Library (ITIL) need to specify the level of service 
provided to their customers. The implemented service 
needs to comply with this specification. We propose a 
method for describing declarative specifications of 
services, and of their planned constructions. These 
specifications can then be used to verify the alignment 
between the specification and the construction. This 
method is based on first-order logic and on refinement 
theory for alignment verification. The alignment 
verification is automated using the Alloy specification 
language and the Alloy Analyzer tool. The method is 
illustrated with the example of a utility emergency 
service inspired from a real project.  
 
1 Introduction 
 
The Information Technology Infrastructure Library 
(ITIL) is a collection of good practices for the 
management of IT services. The perceived value of 
ITIL is the improvements of the relationship between 
the business and its IT service providers. The 
relationship between the business and its internal IT 
department is defined with the use of a Service Level 
Agreements (SLA). Similar agreements define the 
relationships between sub-departments of the IT 
department (Operational Level Agreements, OLA) and 
between the IT departments and its external providers 
(Underpinning Contract, UC). For the IT department to 
be able to live up to its obligations defined in the SLA, 
it has to make sure that the SLA is implementable with 
the existing and envisioned infrastructure and with its 
OLAs and UCs. In this paper we propose a formal 
method for specifying SLAs, OLAs and UCs and for 
verifying the alignment between an SLA and a set of 
OLAs that implement this SLA. Alignment verification 
is considered as important by the design teams: when a 
design team negotiates what an IT service should do 
(i.e. negotiate the SLA), the team needs to understand 
how they will implement the service (i.e. they define 
the relevant OLAs). Not checking the alignment 
between the SLA and the OLAs can lead to the 
specification of services that cannot be implemented.  
The method we present is based on SEAM [1]. 
SEAM is a visual modeling language designed to 
model business and IT system. We illustrate our 
method with a concrete ITIL project currently in 
progress. This project is done for the public utility of 
Geneva: SIG (http://www.sig-ge.ch/) in collaboration 
with the consulting company Itecor and the EPFL 
University. Whereas we are inspired by this real 
project, the formal techniques we describe in this paper 
are in their early development, we have therefore 
substantially simplified the actual processes. To 
account for the fact that the example is an academic 
illustration only, we use the name City Industrial 
Service to refer to the utility company. 
We illustrate first how an IT service can be 
specified with a visual model; this specification 
corresponds to the ITIL SLA. We then show how the 
planned implementation of the IT service can also be 
specified using the same notation; with this we define a 
set of OLAs. The challenge is then the verification of 
the alignment of these specifications (i.e. of the SLA 
with the set of OLAs). For this, we define a formal 
semantics for our notation, and we map this semantics 
to a specification language called Alloy 
(http://alloy.mit.edu). To be able to check the 
alignment between two specifications in general (and 
between the SLA and the OLAs in particular), we 
reduce the problem of alignment verification between 
visual specifications to the problem of verification of 
refinement correctness between specifications written 
in Alloy. We implement this verification with the 
Alloy Analyzer – a tool for analysis of specifications 
written in the Alloy specification language.  
In Section 2, we present an example of SLA and the 
corresponding OLAs specified using SEAM. In 
Section 3, we present the formal semantics for the 
SEAM notation, the mapping of visual specifications 
to Alloy, and how the alignment is validated using the 
Alloy Analyzer tool. In Section 4, we present the 
related work.  
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2 Case study: Gas Incident Service  
 
The City Industrial Service provides, among other 
services, water, gas, and electricity to Geneva 
residents. One of the important responsibilities is the 
management of gas incidents, i.e. leaks from gas 
machinery or pipes. The gas incident service is 
specified as: “The CIS has to neutralize a gas escape 
reported by a witness. The CIS shall guarantee that, if 
the incident site is not secured within 45 min from the 
witness call registration by the CIS operator, an 
emergency call is made to the local Fire Brigade. An 
IT system monitors the process and calls automatically 
the Fire Brigade when the deadline is reached. The IT 
system needs to log the incidents  
The IT department provides the IT system 
IT_GasIncident. This IT system provides the 
service GasIncidentS support for this 
responsibility, it is the IT service called 
GasIncidentService. This service is provided 
by. When we specify the SLA of a service and the 
OLAs of a service implementation, we model twice the 
IT system: once as a whole and once as a composite. 
When modeled as a whole, we analyze the IT system 
as a black box and we specify the service provided by 
the system, i.e. the SLA (Section 2.1). When modeled 
as a composite, we analyze the construction of the IT 
system, i.e. the OLAs (Section 2.2).  
 
2.1 Service Specification  
 
Fig. 1 describes, in SEAM, the service provided by the 
IT system: the ITGasIncident_w (the postfix “w” 
indicates that the IT system is represented as whole) 
provides a service LA_GasIncidentService (the 
prefix “LA” indicates that this is a localized action – an 
action executed by a system alone). The IT system 
manages an incidentList and a locationList. 
The incidentList contains a list of Incident. 
Each incident has characteristics such as callTime, 
description, etc… The LA_GasIncidentService 
has an association to an Incident (referenced as 
newInc). This association refers to the new incident 
that is created when a witness calls. The service is also 
associated with input and output parameters. For 
example, WitnessCall represents the information 
provided by the witness when she notices a gas escape. 
The parameter SiteSecuredTime represents the 
event that indicates to the IT system that the situation 
is secured. The EmergencySignal is the event sent 
to the Fire Brigade if the situation is not secured after 
45 minutes.  
 
 
 
Figure 1: SEAM specification of the service 
LA_GasIncidentService (ITIL SLA) 
As explained, the service modifies the properties of the 
system. For example, when the service creates a new 
incident, newInc, it sets t1 (i.e. CallTime) of 
newInc with the parameter a (i.e. CallTime) from 
the WitnessCall. These changes are described with 
preconditions and postconditions. The precondition 
specifies the system state for the action to be executed; 
the postcondition specifies the result of the action. To 
express preconditions and postconditions, we use a 
specification language called Alloy 
(http://alloy.mit.edu/). Alloy is a declarative 
specification language that will be further described in 
Section 3. The preconditions and the postconditions are 
specified for all services. An example of a 
postcondition written in Alloy is:  
((newInc.t3 - newInc.t1 <= 45)  
  and (out_emergency=0)) or 
((newInc.t4 = newInc.t1 > 45) 
  and (out_emergency=1)) 
This postcondition specifies that if newInc.t3 (i.e. 
the SiteSecutedTime – see Fig. 1) minus 
newInc.t1 (i.e. the CallTime – see Fig. 1) is smaller 
or equal to 45, then out_emergency=0 which 
means that no emergency signal is sent. Otherwise, an 
emergency signal is sent. We use the syntax of Alloy in 
the expression. Using this language, the service can be 
fully specified in a declarative style (see Fig. 5).  
 
2.2 Service Construction  
 
Once the service is specified, it is important to 
understand how the service can be implemented. To do 
so, the design team analyzes the IT system as a 
composite.
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Figure 2: Service implementation modeled as SEAM distributed action 
 
This is illustrated in Fig.2 that represents 
ITGasIncident_c (the postfix “c” means that the 
IT system is represented as a composite). The goal is 
now to understand how the SLA that defines the 
service is implemented by OLAs that define the 
responsibilities of each application that constitutes the 
IT system. Concretly, IT_GasIncident_c, which 
describes the planned construction of 
IT_GasIncident_w, has three component 
applications: (1) SAP_App, the SAP application, 
which processes the data from the help desk and 
provides the CIS operator with the GPS coordinates of 
the site; (2) the ECS_App application (Emergency Call 
Service), which provides an automated call service to 
the local fire brigade; and (3) GasIncident_App 
application that coordinates the incident processing, 
triggers the call to the fire brigade after and maintains 
the incident record in the incident list. Specifications of 
the services offered by these applications correspond to 
Operational Levels Agreements (OLAs).  
The action DA_GasIncidentService specifies 
how the responsibilities in the incident securing are 
distributed between the applications (the prefix “DA” 
indicates that this is a distributed action – an action 
executed by multiple systems that collaborate). The 
shared properties attached to 
DA_GasIncidentService represent the kind of 
information shared by the systems; it is a declarative 
representation of the information exchange between 
them.  
GasIncidentService is a declarative process 
specification that defines the conditions and the results 
of the process but does not impose any constraints on 
how this process has to be conducted in a particular 
environment. It is the implementation of the service 
LA_GasIncidentService (Fig. 1). The 
LA_GasIncidentProcess action specifies the 
responsibility of the GasIncident_App application 
and is also modeled declaratively: we describe the 
actions to execute but not the control flow. 
Let’s illustrate how an incident is processed. 
WitnessCall represents the input parameters to the 
system. The behavior of all the systems is specified as 
follows: In GasIncident_App, the 
Gas_IncidentApp controls the process. In 
SAP_App, the Address is transformed in 
geographical information (GeoInfo). The ECS_App 
is responsible to convert an Incident into an 
EmergencyMessage (sent to the Fire Brigade) 
when an EmergencySignal is received.  
As explained in Section 2.1, the visual specification 
is not sufficient to fully specify the behavior. For this 
reason, we have – for each action – an Alloy 
description of the preconditions and the postconditions 
of the action. For lack of space, we do not provide an 
example of these descriptions in this paper.   
  
The SEAM specification of 
LA_GasIncidentService in Fig. 1 corresponds 
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to the SLA. The SEAM specification of 
DA_GasIncidentService together with 
LA_GasIncidentProcess, 
LA_LocalizeAddress and LA_CallFB in Fig. 2 
show the implementation of this SLA by the three 
applications. The specification of the service offered 
by each application is an OLA. The transition from the 
specification of the SLA (Fig. 1) to the specification of 
the multiple OLAs (Fig. 2) is a result of the 
specification refinement. We consider that the SLA 
and the OLAs are aligned when the refinement is 
correct. Intuitively, this is relatively obvious: input and 
output parameters should be the same between the 
SLA and the combined OLAs, the preconditions and 
the postconditions should be compatible, etc… In this 
paper, our goal is to illustrate how we can define 
formally this notion of alignment. The refinement 
relation that we introduce in Section 3 makes explicit 
this relation between the SLA and the OLAs.  
 
3 Alignment and Semantics of Visual 
System Specifications  
 
We claim that the service construction (OLAs) is 
aligned with its specification (SLA) if the service 
construction represents a correct refinement of the 
service specification. This is the notion of the correct 
refinement adopted from software engineering 
[4][5][6].  
 
To mechanically check if the refinement is correct, we 
proceed as following:  
We provide a formal semantics for SEAM based on 
first-order logic (FOL) and set theory. This semantics 
specifies as a set of mapping rules that transforms the 
SEAM specifications of the SLA (Fig. 1) and of the 
OLAs (Fig 2) into predicated written in Alloy (note 
that the SEAM specification already includes 
annotations written in Alloy; using these annotations 
we specify the preconditions and the postconditions). 
The correspondence between the SEAM specification 
and Alloy is illustrated in Fig. 3: P1 is the translation in 
Alloy of the SLA, P2 is the translation in Alloy of the 
OLAs. We can verify the refinement correctness 
between P1 and P2 using the Alloy Analyzer tool 
(http://alloy.mit.edu/). We use the Alloy Analyzer to 
validate that the model of the service construction does 
not violate but does simulate the model of the service 
specification. This corresponds to the alignment 
verification. 
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Figure 3: Refinement verification 
 
3.1 First Order Logic Semantics for the 
SEAM Notation 
 
First, we define the concept of working object that 
represents the IT system in the SEAM model. Note that 
working objects are also used to represent other kinds 
of systems (such as companies, value system, etc…).  
For every action A of a working object we define a 
precondition and a postcondition. Postcondition postA  is a 
condition that a working object meets after the action 
termination. Precondition preA specifies a condition that 
must hold upon the action execution: If A is started in a 
state satisfying preA , it is guaranteed to terminate in a 
state satisfying postA  
Precondition and postcondition are modeled as predicates 
over state spaceΣ : 
 
},{:
},,{:
falsetrueA
falsetrueA
post
pre
→Σ×Σ
→Σ
   (1) 
The precondition of the action A specifies a set of 
states of a working object, where A is applicable. This 
set is called the set of pre-states for A; it represents a 
subset of a state space ∑ of the working object and 
denoted: Σ⊆Σ
preA
. A state X of the working object 
satisfies the precondition of the action A if and only if 
it belongs to the set of pre-states of A: 
preApre
XXAX Σ∈⇔Σ∈∀ )(|   (2) 
A postcondition of the action A defines a relation 
between the states of a working object before and after 
this action respectively.  A set of action post-states 
postA
Σ  is defined as all states 'X of the working object 
after the action termination and can be denoted as 
follows: 
postpre ApostA
XXXAXX Σ∈⇔Σ∈∀Σ∈∀ ')',(||'
     (3) 
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Here X  is a pre-state of A.  
Action A  defines a transition of the working object 
from state X  to state 'X  (pre- and post-states 
respectively). We define a SEAM action as a binary 
FOL-formula },{: falsetrueA →Σ×Σ . We 
specify the SEAM action using logical implication 
between precondition and postcondition: 
)',()(:)',( XXAXAXXA postpre →  (4) 
If at a given state X  the precondition Apre of the action 
A holds, then the working object will be transited to a state 
'X , for which the postcondition of A - postA - holds.  
For actions with invariants we write: 
)'()'()',(
)()()(:)',(
XSXAXXA
XAXAXSXXA
invinvpost
preinvinv
∧∧
→∧∧   
 
3.2 Refinement  
 
We formulate the problem of refinement verification 
using a theory of Data Refinement [5][6]. 
The relationship between the service specification 
and the service construction is captured by the notion 
of refinement, adopted from software engineering 
[10][4]. In software engineering, a program 
specification development is considered as a sequence 
of refinement steps, leading from the abstract 
specification towards its implementation. Along those 
lines, SEAM model development can be considered as 
a stepwise refinement of its graphical specifications 
[2]. More precisely, refinement in SEAM specifies a 
transition from one organizational level, where the 
working object is presented as a whole, to another 
organizational level, where the same working object is 
presented as a composite. A specification of a working 
object as a whole is usually called ‘abstract’ and a 
specification of a working object as a composite – 
‘concrete’. We say that the concrete specification 
refines the abstract specification. A relation between 
the state spaces of the abstract and the concrete working 
objects is called a refinement relation.  
Verification of refinement is largely based on the 
use of simulation techniques [7]. By the simulation we 
understand a correspondence between the states of two 
systems, abstract and concrete, where the concrete 
system is considered an implementation and the 
abstract system – its specification.  
Let us consider a working objects W seen as a whole, and 
specified on the state space aΣ  with a localized action aA , 
and a working object W’, seen as a composite, and specified 
on the state space cΣ  with a distributed action cA .  
Definition 1: Given a refinement relation between state 
spaces, W’ is called a correct refinement of W if and 
only if for each run of the 
},{: falsetrueR ca →Σ×Σ concrete action Ac of 
W’, which starts at ccX Σ∈  and terminates at 
ccX Σ∈' , there exists a run Aa of W, which starts at 
aaX Σ∈  such that ),( ca XXR  holds and 
terminates at 'aX , such that )','( ca XXR holds. 
This refinement is illustrated in Fig. 4. cA  correctly 
refines aA  if, when cA  makes a transition from its pre-state  
cX  to its post-state cX ' , aA  is also making a transition 
from its pre-state aX  to its post-state aX ' , and these states 
are related by R . 
 
Figure 4: The refinement in SEAM 
This definition can be expressed as follows: 
( )
)','()',(
|')',(),(
|,',
};,{:
caaaa
aacccca
aaccc
ca
XXRXXA
XXXAXXR
XXX
falsetrueR
∧
Σ∈∃⇒∧
Σ∈Σ∈∀
→Σ×Σ
(5) 
if refinement relation is a total function acR Σ→Σ: , 
we rewrite (6): 
))'(),((
)',(|',
cca
cccccc
XRXRA
XXAXX ⇒Σ∈∀
        (6) 
The expression in Eq. (6) will be validated with the 
Alloy Analyzer tool.  
 
3.3 Mapping to Alloy Specification 
Language 
 
Alloy is a declarative specification language developed 
by the Software Design Group at MIT. Alloy is a 
language for expressing complex structural constraints 
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and behavior based on first-order logic (FOL). 
Therefore, SEAM specifications, formalized in FOL, 
can be directly mapped to Alloy. 
We map SEAM specifications, formalized in FOL, 
to the Alloy specification language [3] and so it is 
possible to check the refinement automatically.  
SEAM actions, formalized as first-order formulae, 
with their preconditions, postconditions and invariants, 
formalized as predicates are mapped to Alloy 
predicates. Action parameters are mapped to 
parameters of predicates in Alloy. 
We specify abstract and concrete actions performed 
by a system as Alloy predicates with variables 
representing the system states before and after the 
action. We define refinement relations between system 
states of the abstract and concrete specifications as 
Alloy predicates. We validate the refinement 
correctness from Definition 1 specified as Alloy 
assertion.  
Based on the formal semantics, visual 
specification of a service and its planned construction 
can be represented as Alloy data structures with a 
behavior expressed as predicates. The assertion that 
one behavior can be always simulated by the other (a 
correct refinement) is expressed as an Alloy assertion. 
Technically, verification of refinement correctness 
between two visual specifications is reduced to a proof 
of validity of this assertion. 
 
3.4 Refinement Verification in Alloy 
Analyzer 
To proceed with the specification analysis and alignment 
verification, we map the SEAM visual specifications to 
Alloy. Figure 5 illustrates the result of translation of the 
LA_GasIncidentProcess (Fig.1) to Alloy 
specification language.  
In mapping the SEAM specification to the Alloy 
specification language, the annotations made to the diagrams 
are used to specify the action in Alloy  
In Fig. 2, lines 1-2 defines the Alloy signature that 
specifies the action, line 3 specifies the action 
precondition, and lines 4-13 specify the action 
postcondition.  
An Alloy predicate specifies a logical formula. 
Executing this predicate, Alloy Analyzer decides 
whether the formula is satisfiable. Mechanically, Alloy 
analyzer attempts to find a binding of the variables to 
values - that makes the formula true. For example, the 
output trace for the execution of a distributed action 
specification DA_GasIncidentService looks as 
follows: 
Executing "Run DA_GasIncidentService for 5" 
Solver=sat4j Bitwidth=4 MaxSeq=5 Symmetry=20  
8632 vars. 1035 primary vars. 22316 clauses. 238ms.  
Instance found. Predicate is consistent. 92ms. 
 
1. pred LA_GasIncidentService [incidentList_pre, 
incidentList_post: set Incident, 
locationList_prepost: set GEOInfo, in_call:one 
WitnessCall, in_securedTime: one Int, 
2.out_emergency: one Int, out_incident: one 
Incident] { 
3.  ((in_call.t >0 )and (in_securedTime >0)) =>  
4.(one newInc: Incident | //fresh inc created 
5.(!(newInc in incidentList_pre)) and //Added to the 
list: 
6.(incidentList_post = incidentList_pre + newInc ) 
and 
//Initial values from the witness call: 
7.(newInc.t1 =  in_call.t) and (newInc.info =  
in_call.d) and 
//GPS data is obtained from the Address 
8.(one loc: GEOInfo | (loc in locationList_prepost) 
and  
9.(loc.a = in_call.a) and (newInc.siteInfo = loc)) 
and 
//secured time as an income call from the technician  
10.((newInc.t3 =  in_securedTime))and 
 //either the site is secured within 45 min or 
emergency sent 
11.(((newInc.t3 - newInc.t1 <= 45) and 
(out_emergency=0)) or  
12.((newInc.t4 = newInc.t1 > 45) and 
(out_emergency=1))) and 
13.(out_incident = newInc))} 
Figure 5: Alloy specification of the localized action 
LA_GasIncidentService. 
 
To relate the SLA - with the combination of OLAs, we 
have to guarantee the correct refinement from the 
localized action LA_GasIncidentService to the 
distributed action DA_GasIncidentService. In 
our example, by the Definition 1, we consider the 
distributed action DA_GasIncidentService as 
the concrete specification and the localized action 
LA_GasIncidentService as the abstract 
specification. We rewrite (5) as an Alloy assertion that 
stands the correct refinement.  
R_LA_to_DA (Fig. 6) is a refinement relation that 
relates state spaces of the IT_GasIncident_w and 
IT_GasIncident _c. R_Input and R_Output 
are relations between input and output parameters 
respectively. 
Checking the LA_DA assertion (Fig. 7), the 
Alloy Analyzer tries to find a counterexample – a set 
of variables of the model that will falsify this assertion. 
Given our specification, Alloy Analyzer produces the 
following log: 
 
Executing "Check LA_DA" 
   Solver=sat4j Bitwidth=4 MaxSeq=4 Symmetry=20 6141 
vars. 630 primary vars. 17014 clauses. 416ms. 
   No counterexample found. Assertion may be valid. 
168ms. 
 
At a given test space, our assertion is valid, i.e. the 
distributed action that specifies the service construction 
correctly refines the service specification modeled as 
the localized action.  
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If the analyzer finds no counterexample – this 
means that the assertion may be valid (i.e. it is valid for 
a limited scope considered by the analyzer but none 
knows if it is valid out of this scope). To prove 
refinement correctness, the same assertion can be 
examined by theorem provers. Successful case here 
(i.e. when prove is found), means assertion validity. 
 
pred R_LA_to_DA[incidentList_t: set Incident, 
locationList_t: set GEOInfo, mList_t: set 
EmergencyMsg,  // model concrete 
incidentList1_t: set Incident, 
locationList1_t: set GEOInfo]{ // model abstract 
 ( incidentList_t=  incidentList1_t) and 
 ( locationList_t=  locationList1_t)} 
 
pred R_Input[in_call: one WitnessCall, 
in_call1: one WitnessCall, in_securedTime, 
in_securedTime1: one Int ]{ 
in_call = in_call1 and 
in_securedTime = in_securedTime1} 
 
pred R_Output[out_emergencyCall: EmergencyMsg, 
out_Incident: one Incident, out_emergency: one 
Int]{ 
(out_emergency = 1) => 
(out_emergencyCall.inc = out_Incident )}
Figure 6: Alloy specification of a refinement relation 
between the localized and the distributed actions. 
assert LA_DA{  
all incidentList_pre: IDB, mList_pre: MSG, 
in_call: WitnessCall, in_securedTime: Int, 
incidentList1_pre: IDB, in_call1: WitnessCall, 
in_securedTime1: Int| 
all incidentList_post: IDB, mList_post: MSG, 
out_emergencyCall: EmergencyMsg, 
locationList_prepost: GEO,  
 incidentList1_post: IDB, out_Incident: 
Incident, out_emergency:Int, 
locationList1_prepost: GEO| 
(DA_GasIncidentService[incidentList_pre.v, 
incidentList_post.v, locationList_prepost.v,  
mList_pre.v, mList_post.v, in_call, 
out_emergencyCall, in_securedTime] and 
R_LA_to_DA[incidentList_pre.v, 
locationList_prepost.v, mList_pre.v,//model 
concrete 
incidentList1_pre.v, locationList1_prepost.v] 
and R_Input[in_call, in_call1, in_securedTime, 
in_securedTime1])=> 
(LA_GasIncidentService_w[incidentList1_pre.v, 
incidentList1_post.v, locationList1_prepost.v, 
in_call1, in_securedTime1, out_emergency, 
out_Incident]   
and R_LA_to_DA[incidentList_post.v, 
locationList_prepost.v, 
mList_post.v,incidentList1_post.v, 
locationList1_prepost.v] and  
R_Output[out_emergencyCall, out_Incident, 
out_emergency])}  
Figure 7: Alloy assertion that stands the correct 
refinement from abstract to concrete specification based 
on Definition 1. 
4 Related Work 
 
There are two main approaches to formal 
verification: model checking [11] and a theorem 
proving based on logical inference [12]. Model 
checking is an approach for verifying requirements and 
design for a vast class of systems, including real-time 
embedded and safety-critical systems. Model checkers 
include such tools as [9][13]. The major drawback of 
the model checking is a state explosion problem, which 
originates from the fact that for real systems the size of 
the state space grows exponentially with the number of 
processes [14]. 
The second approach is an automated theorem 
proving based on logical inference. Within this 
approach, the fact that the system specification (a 
model) satisfies a certain property is expressed as a 
logical formula. The task is to prove the validity of this 
formula, deducing it from a set of axioms exist for the 
underlying logic (e.g. first-, second-, higher-order logic 
etc), and hypotheses made about the system. Theorem 
proving for the first-order logic is well developed and 
widely represented in the literature (see for example 
[15]). Higher order and other logics are more 
expressive and appropriate for wider range of problems 
then first-order logic; however the automated theorem 
proving for these logics is more complicated [16]. 
In our method we can use both techniques. The 
paper presents an implementation based on model 
checking.  
Visual modeling methods discussed below, share 
common concepts with SEAM, i.e. hierarchical 
structure of models. These methods also specify the 
semantics of transitions between their hierarchical 
levels similarly to refinement in SEAM. Although, up 
to our knowledge, none of these approaches uses the 
formal specification languages to provide an automated 
analysis of specifications. 
Design & Engineering Methodology for 
Organizations (DEMO) [17] is an EA framework based 
on the organizational theory called Language/Action 
Perspective. DEMO defines its organizational levels 
based on a communication paradigm. Functional levels 
are defined in DEMO based on the view of business 
processes as transactions. DEMO defines functional 
and constructional decompositions as techniques for 
dealing with complexity of the modeled system. 
Decomposition techniques for DEMO models can be 
associated with refinement.   
Object-Process Methodology (OPM) [18] proposes 
a method for the complete integration of the systems' 
states and behaviors within a single graphical model. 
OPM defines abstracting and refining of its 
specifications as subtypes of the process called scaling. 
In OPM, there exist three types of hierarchies: 
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aggregation-participation, exhibition-characterization, 
and generalization-specialization. Transition to the 
next (lower) hierarchical level in OPM is a result of the 
refinement mode called unfolding. 
Object-oriented modeling method for software 
called ADORA (Analysis and Description of 
Requirements and Architecture) is presented in [19]. 
Models in ADORA are composed of hierarchically 
structured abstract objects. The mechanism of 
hierarchical decomposition is applied to views [20]. 
ADORA defines a formal refinement calculus semantic 
for the structural, behavioral, and user views. Basic 
refinement types as well as refinement rules for each of 
these views are defined. 
In Goal-Oriented Requirements Engineering, the 
KAOS method [21] bears much resemblance to our 
approach. KAOS formally aligns high level goals with 
requirements for an IT system. It is based on temporal 
logic and is mainly used for the requirements of real-
time embedded systems. 
In [22] the authors represent the business process as 
a trajectory in a state space. The authors attempt to 
describe declaratively the dynamics of a business 
process by defining a notion of a valid state and 
planning rules that make a state valid. This notation 
has similar roots with SEAM representation of a 
system as a working object having a state and an action 
that changes this state. 
 
5 Conclusions 
In ITIL, The service specification is described with 
a service level agreement (SLA). To support this 
agreement, the IT service providers need to specify the 
planned implementation – with OLAs. ITIL does not 
propose specific technique to verify whether an SLA is 
adequately supported by the UCs and the OLAs. This 
work addresses process definition and the relation 
between the process definition and the process goal 
(the SLA in our case). 
In this paper, we have shown how a software 
engineering technique, i.e. refinement theory, can be 
applied to verify the alignment between the service 
specification (SLAs) and the service construction 
(OLAs), modeled declaratively [8]. Our declarative 
specifications define an IT service and its construction. 
We have also illustrated how Alloy can be used to 
verify the alignment.  
Future work includes the development of a simpler 
notation for use in business workshops, the extension 
of the technique to larger scale examples, and the 
separation of ITIL utility (functional requirements) and 
ITIL warranty (non functional requirements). 
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